Abstract: In this paper,¹ Ie xamine Wittgenstein'sc onception of reason and rationality through the lens of his conception of reasons.C entral in this context, Ia rgue, is the imageo ft he chain, which informs not onlyh is methodologyi n the form of the chain-method, but alsoh is conception of reasons as linking up immediately, like the links of ac hain. If irst provide ag eneral sketch of what reasons are on Wittgenstein'sv iew, arguing that giving reasons consists in making thoughta nd action intelligible by delineating reasoning routes; that something is ar eason not in virtue of some intrinsic property,b ut in virtue of its role; and that citing something as areason characterises it in terms of the rational relations it stands in accordingt ocontext-dependent norms. Ithen argue that on Wittgenstein'sview,wemisconceive chains of reasons if we think of them on the model of chains of causes. Chains of reasons are necessarilyf inite, because they are anchored in and held in place by our reason-giving practices, and it is in virtueo ft heir finitude that chains of reasons can guide, justify and explain. Ia rgue that this liberates us from the expectation that one should be able to give reasons for everything,b ut that it limits the reach of reasons by tying them to particular reasoning-practices that they cannot themselvesjustify.I end by comparinga nd reconcilingW ittgenstein'sd ichotomyb etween chains of reasons and chains of causes with seemingly competing construals of the dichotomy, and Iclarify its relation to the dichotomyb etween explanation and justification.
Introduction
"Reason" is not one of Wittgenstein'sw ords. When it comes to "reasons",h owever,m atters are different.R easons are ar ecurrent concern in the comparably neglected writingsr angingf rom his return to Cambridge in 1929 to the autumn of 1936,h is so-called middle period. In these writings, Wittgenstein offers us a rich and nuanced overview of the roles playedb yr easons in how we act and speak,d eveloping ac onception of reason and rationalityt hat went on to form an enduringb uttress to his later thought.
The keytoWittgenstein'sconception of reasons lies in understanding aguiding imageo ft his middle period: the imageo ft he chaino fr easons. That "the chain of reasons has an end" (PI 2009:3 26) i sp erhapso ne of Wittgenstein's best-known claims; yeti ti sn ot in the Investigations,b ut in his work from the early1 930s that he most explicitlyengages with this idea and with its correlate, the expectation that one should always be in ap osition to provide reasons.I n manys cattered and apophthegmatic remarks, he provides grounds for thinking that this expectation is misguided,tracing it to the tendencytothink of chains of reasons on the model of chains of causes. My aim here is to elucidateW ittgenstein'so wn conception of the chain of reasons and to contrast it with rival conceptions by reconstructing Wittgenstein'sa nswers to three questions: (i) what reasons are, (ii) whychains of reasons must come to an end while chains of causes must not,and (iii) how this relates to the distinction between explanation and justification.
Giving Reasons
What are reasons?Characteristically, Wittgenstein transposes this Socratic question into ap ragmatic key: what do we do when we give reasons?H is answer is composed of four interrelated ideas: (i) giving reasons consists in making thoughta nd action intelligible by delineating the reasoningr outes that lead to them; (ii) whether something is ar eason and what kind of reason it is depends on its role on occasions of utterance; (iii) citing something as ar eason does not characterise the item cited psychologically, in terms of the psychological or causal connections it stands in, but rationally, in terms of the rational connections it stands in; (iv) the norms of reasoning delineating what rational connections an item standsi nd epend on the languageg ame in which the item is adduced as a reason.
First,t he concept of ar eason is tied for Wittgenstein to the concept of reasoning, the "transitionf rom one proposition to another" (RFM 1978:3 9; cf. AWL1 979: 4f.; BBB 1958:1 4f.; LA 1966:21f.) . Thish olds for theoretical as well as for practical reasoning: "An inferencei satransition to an assertion; and so also to the behaviour that corresponds to the assertion. 'Id rawt he consequences' not onlyi nwords, but also in deeds" (PI 2009:486) . The importance of the seemingly innocuous claim that reasons are tied to reasoning lies in the fact that if reasons are to be capable of being the sort of entities we reason our wayfrom and to, i. e. of being premises and conclusions in theoretical and practical reasoning,t hey must be capable of being expressed in propositional form. Otherwise, some have argued, the connection between reasons and reasoning is severed.² But for Wittgenstein, the claim that reasons must be capable of being expressed propositionallyi si mplicit in his concern with reasons as the correlates of demands for reasons and explanations, as the kinds of things that can be giveninanswer to "Why?"-questions. Reasons are considerations expressible in propositional form that servet og uide, justify and explain what we believe, desire and do.
In the Blue Book,Wittgenstein givest wo characterisations of what giving a reason consists in: "Giving areason for something one did or said means showing aw ay which leadst ot his action" (BBB 1958:14) ; soon thereafter,h ew rites: "Giving ar eason is likeg iving ac alculation by which youh avea rriveda tacertain result" (BBB 1958:15) . Both characterisations owe much to traditionali magery.The first characterisation, which we might call at opological one, is reminiscent of ancient rhetoric in that it links the capacity to give reasonsPlato's lógon didónai (1930:5 10c7) -to as patial image, much as Aristotle does in the Topics with the tópoi,the commonplaces of reason from which arguments are derived( 1989:1 00a25 -27). It alsoe choes locutions such as "ways of thought", "deliberative routes",o r" steps in reasoning",a nd Wittgenstein himself refers to the giving of reasons in several places as the indication of "the road one walks" (BBB 1958:1 4) , "the road youw ent" (LA 1966:2 1), "the step in the calculus" (AWL 1979:4) a nd "the process by which" (LA 1966:22) one arrivesa ta na nswer to a "Why?"-question. The second characterisation, which compares reasoning to calculating,a lsoh arks back to classical notions: the word "reason" shares its etymologyw ith the word "rational",w hich has its roots in the latin verb reri,o ne meaningo fw hich is "to calculate".
Both characterisations indicate that giving areason serves to make athought or an action intelligible by describing the train of thoughts which leadstoit. Even if it is true that "in the beginning was the deed" (OC1 969: 402),deeds need interpretation. Mere behaviour,inorder to be intelligible as aform of action, must be interpretable as an expression of intentions, as aset of movementsconducted in the light of reasons.A sl ong as those reasons escape us, the behaviour will appear puzzling.Wittgenstein givest he example of someone who "gets angry, when we see no reason for it " (LW1982: 192) .This behaviour can become intelligible to me, however,when I "see the trains of thoughtand Iknow how they lead to his actions" (LW1 982: 193) . When this happens, "Iu nderstand his actions", and he stops "being ar iddle to me" .
Second, Wittgenstein'sc haracterisation of reasons is situated not at the ontological level, but at the semantic level: it focuses not on what reasons are or what their intrinsic nature is, but on their role in languageu se. Whether something is areason depends on its role on occasions of utterance.Whatunderpins this approach is the realisation that "what characterizes an order as such, or a description as such, or aq uestion as such, etc., is […]t he role which the utterance of these signs plays in the whole practice of the language" (BBB 1958: 103 -4) . Wittgenstein is interested in what he calls the "function of giving reasons" (RPP 1980b: 314) . He rejects the idea thatreasons have an intrinsic nature to be investigated by philosophyindependentlyofthe role they playinlanguage. Reasons are adduced in answer to "Why?"-questions to serveaparticular purpose, namelyt od elineate ap ath of deliberation or calculation towards what they are reasons for.
At the coreofthis characterisation of reasons is the idea that reasons are relational: what is characteristic of reasons is not what one mentions in giving them, but the relation between what is mentioned and what it is mentioned for. Fore xample, one might sayt hat the fact that the fridge door has been left open is ar eason to think thatt he ice will melt.A sW ittgenstein approaches the subjectofreasons,itisnot something peculiarabout the fact that the fridge door has been left open that makes it areason for anything -it is afact like any other.B ut in adducing that fact as ar eason, one characterises it in terms of a relation, namelyt he relation of being ar eason to believes omething.I nc iting something as ar eason, one characterises the item cited in terms of its role in asystem of rationallyrelated propositions and actions -its role in what Wittgenstein alreadythoughtofatthe time as an "activity" (BT 2005:230) , a "game" (BT 2005:2 31), a "system of communication" (BBB 1958:8 1) or a "language-game" (BBB 1958:1 7; BT 2005:4 ) : "If one asks for the reason behind an individual act of thought(act of calculation), the answer one gets is an analysis of asystem to which the act belongs" (BT 2005:2 31). In the (not fullyd ependable) lecture notes taken by his students, Wittgenstein givest he example of someone who is asked: "Whyd id youw rite 6249 under the line?",a nd who answers with: "I arriveda ti tb yt his multiplication" (LA 1966:2 1). As Wittgenstein pointso ut, this means that "Ip assed through such and such ap rocess of reasoning" (LA 1966:2 1), and "to ask for ar eason is to ask how one arriveda tt he result" (AWL 1979:5) . Ar eason is givenwheno ne "goes back one step in the calculus" (AWL 1979:4) , making the concluding step in the train of reasoning -the resultintelligible by indicating the step that led up to it: "Ar eason is astep preceding the step of the choice" (BBB 1958:88) . On this account,itisonlywithin and as a part of a "system" (BT 2005:231) or a "calculus" (BT 2005:267)t hat something can have the significanceo fareason. To cite something as ar eason is to characterise the item cited relationallyb yr edescribing it in terms of its role as a step in reasoning towards some proposition or action.
Third, Wittgenstein spells out this role-oriented view of reasons not in psychological or causal terms,but in normative ones: what is cited as areason performs its function of indicating the reasoningprocess leading to an actionnot in the sense that it specifies the process by which, causallyorpsychologically, one in fact gott here through the psychological or causal connections the item cited stands in, but in the sense thati ts howsh ow, rationally, one gets there through the rationalc onnections the item cited stands in. Giving ar eason for something one did does not provide ap sychological answer to the question of "how one arriveda tt he result",b ut rather "teachesu sc onnections in ac alculus" (BT 2005:2 67), connections which are determined independentlyo fu s: "reasons for accepting [a] proposition are not personal matters,b ut parts of the calculus to which the proposition belongs" (BT 2005:267) . Onlyin"some cases" does giving areason mean "tellingthe wayw hich one has gone oneself" (BBB 1958:14) ; "in others it means describingawaywhich leads thereand is in accordance with certain accepted rules" (BBB 1958:14) . The latter cases Wittgenstein calls justifications post hoc (BBB 1958:14) . Hence, in saying that ar eason is as tep in reasoning,t he reasoning in question is to be understood as including not just the reasoningo ne actually went through, but alsot he reasoning one could have indicated ex post actu if asked. This distinction does much to avoid what Ryle called "the intellectualist legend",a ccording to which "whenever an agent does anything intelligently, his act is precededa nd steered by another internal act of consideringaregulative proposition appropriatet ohis practical problem" (2009:18-19) . Wittgenstein separates reasons from the psychological processes that led to an action by introducing an element which is preciselyn ot "personal",b ut significantly independent of the agent whose reasons are in question.
This sense in which giving ar eason refers to something independent of the agent is broughto ut by Wittgenstein'sd istinction between ways which one has gone oneself, and ways which are "in accordance with certain accepted rules", but which one has not gone oneself. Consider the following passages:
Givingareason sometimesmeans "Iactuallywent this way",sometimes "Icould have gone this way",i .e.s ometimes what we saya cts as aj ustification, not as ar eport of what was done, e. g. Ir emember the answer to aq uestion; when asked whyIgive this answer,I gave ap rocess leadingt oi t, though Id idn'tg ot hrough this process. (LA 1966:22) The question "Forwhatreasons do youbelievethis?" might mean: "From whatreasonsare youn ow derivingi t( have youj ust derivedi t)?" But it might also mean: "With hindsight, what reasons can yougivem ef or this supposition?" (PI 2009:4 79) The wording here is revealing in that the possibility of "showing" and "describing" the wayone went or "could have gone" presupposes that the ways leading to the action are independentlytheret obeshownordescribed. As Wittgenstein puts it in the BigT ypescript: "We are guided, our step has been marked out ahead of time" (BT 2005:186) . If giving reasons is to be understood as showing aw ay "which leads there",t his presupposes the idea of an independentlyo btaining rationalc onnection between two items,o fas et path allowing one to movefrom one item to the other in the reasoningprocess. Asked to give reasons for what one said or did, citing astring of random considerations and presenting them as the reasoningone went through is, by itself, insufficient.I tonlyconstitutes the giving of areason if the considerations cited link up to form areasoning routethat is both rule-conformingand conducive to the statement or action to be justified. What is broughtout here is that "to give areason" typicallyfunctions as what Ryle calls an "achievement" or "success" verb (2009:114), which refers not just to actions, but to "suitable or correct" (2009:115) actions: actions whose performance is at least minimallys uccessful as measured by some standard -in this case, the network of permissible reasoning routes determining what counts as ar eason for what.I ti st his normative requirement to accord with an independent standard which Wittgenstein presumablyp oints to when he speaks of "aw ay which leads there" (BBB 1958:1 4, emphasis added), independentlyo f whether one took it or not.Ashelater puts it, "justification consists in appealing to an independent authority" (PI 2009:265) . To give areason is to ask for away which "leads" to what is done not in the mechanical sense in which it causally accounts for it,but in the normative sense in which it rationallyaccounts for it as what is to be done.
Fourth, the norms of reasoningw hich delineate what rationalc onnections an item stands in are context-sensitive: they depend on the language game, that is, on the interactive and rule-guided complex of activities and languageuse within which the item is adduced as areason. It has often been emphasised -for example by Blackburn (2010:284) -that "Xi sareason" must be understood relationally, that is, not as "Xisareason tout court",but as "Xisareason for Y".Wittgenstein, by contrast,emphasises the dependence on context,thatis, on the languageg ame in which the reason is given. If, having said or done Y, I am asked for my reason, answering Xwill constitutegiving areason for me to say or do YonlyifXdoes in fact,accordingthe norms of the languagegame the reason is giveni n, enable me to make the transition in reasoningf rom Xt oY .W e mayt herefores ay that "…is ar eason…" is af our-placer elational predicate. Let us sharpen this with ad efinition: DEF:Xis a reason for Stoperform an action Yiff Xissuch as to enable the transition in reasoning from XtoYaccordingthe norms of reasoning that apply to Si nc ontext C.
This means thatwhat functions as areason for what is aquestion which, for Wittgenstein, can onlyb ea nswered in the context of ag iven languageg ame. Languageg ames playafundamental role in contexts of reason-giving,b ecause it is within languageg ames that reasons are given, and it is onlyw ith language games thatt hey come into being.A sW ittgenstein puts it: "Not until therei sa languageg ame are there reasons" (RPP 1980b: 689) , and a "reason is ar eason onlyi nside the game" (AWL 1979:4 ) . Thisd ependence of reasons on language games derives from the fact that giving reasons requires one to put forward conceptuallya rticulated propositions as reasons.E vens eemingly less linguistically demanding ways of giving reasons,such as pointingatacolour,requirethe concept of colour to provide reasons (LW1992: 64). Yetour conceptsonlyhavemeaning in the context of the languagegames in which they have ause -"aconcept is in its element within the languagegame" (RPP 1980b: 632 Itthus rests on our ways of acting,which are themselvesbased on our primitive (instinctive,unreflective,prelinguistic) reactions: "instinct comes first,reasoning second" (RPP 1980b: 689) ,and "it is our acting,which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (OC1969: 204). Forthese reasons,l anguageg ames form what Wittgenstein at one point calls "the base" (OC1 969: 609) from which we give reasons.
One straightforward consequenceofmakingreasons dependent on language games in this manner is that the languageg ames not onlyenable, but also limit the giving of reasons.This aspect is most emphaticallyb roughto ut by Wittgenstein in On Certainty,whereitistreated in terms of the importance of the "background" or "world-picture" in determiningwhat counts as areason for what: my "world-picture",s aysW ittgenstein, "is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting" (OC1 969: 162);i ti s"the inherited background against which Idistinguish between true and false" (OC1 969: 94), a "system" which "belongst ot he essence of what we call an argument" (OC1 969: 105) . Even what looks like it must be uncontroversiallya nd universallya ccepted as ar eason depends on there being acertain kind of practice in place for it to be areason. In On Certainty,Wittgenstein wonders whether one could possiblydenythat the "propositions of physics" (OC1969: 608) constituted a "good ground" (OC1969: 608) or a "telling reason" (OC1 969: 609):
Supposingw em et people who did not regardt hat as at elling reason. Now,h ow do we imagine this?I nstead of the physicist,t hey consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrongf or them to consulta no racle and be guided by it? -If we call this "wrong" aren'tweusingour language-game as abase fromwhich to combat theirs? (OC1 969: 609) Is aid Iw ould 'combat' the other man, -but wouldn'tIgive him reasons?C ertainly; but how far do they go?A tt he end of reasonsc omesp ersuasion. (Think what happens when missionariesc onvert natives.) (OC1 969: 612) In these passages, Wittgenstein can be seen to draw some of the consequences that his conception of reasons has for his conception of reason and rationality. If an utterance constitutes giving areason in virtue of the ways in which it functions in certain contexts of use, then ap articular kind of constraint will be provided on what someone can discover thath eo rs he has reason to do. If giving and asking for reasons are activities which can onlye xist within al anguage game, then anyr eason one mayg ived epends, in order to be accessiblet ot he addressee as ar eason, on there beingsome common ground, ashared complex of activities, purposes and language-use in which thereisminimal agreement on what counts as areason for what.Reasons go,asWittgenstein intimates,onlyso far.A bsent this requirement,i ti sn ot the reasons that must be altered, but the conditions under which they are recognised as such -something that is done not by providingm ore reasons,b ut through persuasion or conversion.
TheC hain-Method
In what sense do reasons link up with each other to form chains?T he imageo f the chain of reasons makes its appearance in Wittgenstein'swritingsinthe early 1930s, and occurs at least fourteen times in his middle period. Talk of a chain of reasons highlights the fact that areason maybothprovide justification for areason and itself stand in need of justification by ar eason. Ar eason both supports and is supported by further reasons with which it interlocks,forming ac hain of reasons which can be followed up, reason after reason, with iterated "Why?"-questions. While Wittgenstein resorts to the chain imagei ne arlier writingsa lready ( TLP 1961: 2.03; T LP 1961: 4.22) , it is onlyi nt he 1930s that he connects it to reasons.I ts importance lies in suggesting distinct entities made to hang together not by means of some additional, connective medium, but by being directly locked into each other.
Wittgenstein'se xtensive employment of the chain imagei nt he 1930s does not come from nowhere, and it is worth stepping back from its application to reasons for amoment to consider the ways in which it informs Wittgenstein'smethodologymore generally. As ameans of rendering perspicuous the organisation of arangeo fc learlyi ndividuated but nonetheless interrelated elements, the chain imagew as highlyinfluential in Western thought -as was its sister imageo ft he ladder,which Wittgenstein employs in the Tractatus (TLP 1961: 6.54).F or centuries, the scala naturae and the Great ChainofBeing werethe traditionalrepresentations of the continuity,gradation and hierarchical orderingofall things(Lovejoy 1970:1 85). This imagery was stillv ery much in use in the days of Goethe, whose thoughti tu nderpins both in his literary works (Wyder 1998:6 3) and in his so-called "morphological method",w hich revolvesa round the search for Urphänomene or primordialp henomena,t he last links in seriala rrangements of phenomena which rendertheir interconnections and their overall organisation perspicuous (Nisbet1 972: 39;G lock 1996). The following passagef rom Goethe's TheoryofColours bringsout the connection between primordialphenomena and the chain of interlockingc onsiderations which can be followed up to their last link to shedl ight on the whole:
[…]everythingisgraduallyarranged under higher rules and laws, which,however,are not to be made intelligible by words and hypotheses to the understandingm erely, but,a tt he same time, by real phenomenatothe senses.Wecall these primordial phenomena, because nothingappreciable by the senses lies beyond them, on the contrary,they areperfectlyfit to be consideredasafixed point to which we first ascended, step by step, and from which we may, in likemanner,descend to the commonest case of every-day experience. (Goethe 1840: 175) Not onlywas Wittgenstein familiar with Goethe'swritingsfrom an earlyage,but around 1930,atatime just preceding the occurrence of this figurative expression in Wittgenstein'swritings, he is also known to have been apredominantlyenthusiastic reader of Oswald Spengler,w ho explicitlya cknowledgesh is profound methodological debt to . In Wittgenstein'sh ands, these ideas become what JoachimSchultecalls the "chain-method",the arrangement of things "in such away thatt hey can be seen to hang together and as it wereexplain their own characteristics by means of theirpositions in this chainlike arrangement" (Schulte2 003:6 9).
Where this methodi ss uccessful, it produces what Wittgenstein calls "the understanding that consists in 'seeing connections'" (PI 2009:122) .I nc onversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann, Wittgenstein said: "Here seeing matters essentially: as long as youd on ot see the new system, youh aven ot goti t " (WWK 1979:123) . To connect two things, we do not need a tertium quid which makes the connection. "Thingsm ust connect directly, without ar ope, i. e. they must alreadys tand in ac onnection with one another,l ike the links of a chain" (WWK 1979:155) . At some level, there must be such an immediate connection, as Wittgenstein argues by wayofaregress argument reminiscent of Plato's third man argument in the Parmenides (1996:132a -b):
"If aconnection between twothings always consists in amediation by athird thingthat is connected to each of the two, then two things arenever connected to each other." But that doesn'tmean: Aconnection is never achieved; it'sjust that it makes no sense to say "Aconnection is achieved" (and thereforeneither does its opposite). That is, it makesnosense to talk about "connection";t he concept of "connection" has in no wayb een explained. ( BT 2005:399) Connections -includingt he kind of rational connection we are interested inmust be immediate at some level, because assumingt he contrary,n amelyt hat anyc onnection must be made by some third term, makes it impossiblet os ee how anyt wo thingsc ould ever be connected: if two connected things A and B could onlyb ec onnected by wayo fs ome third term C connected to each of the two, the connection between A and C would in turn have to be explained by wayo famediatingt erm D,i tself connected to each of the two in aw ay that would in turn require mediation, and so on. The resulting regress robs the very notion of ac onnection of its intelligibility.A sW ittgenstein hastens to point out,t his does not demonstrate the impossibility of ever bridging the gap between two things, but it showst he underlying notion of ac onnection to be misconceived. If talk of connections makes anys ense, it must do so under the assumption that wheret here are connections,s ome of them are immediate, like the connections between the links of ac hain. The connections between the links of chains of reasons are made in our reasoning practices: it is through the endorsement of certain inferential patterns in the "everydayp ractice" (PI 2009:1 97)o fr easoningt hat the connections between the links in the chain are effected. To make these connections apparent,n ot heory is required. Things onlyn eed to be arranged in ac ertain way. This is the chain-method.
Finitea nd Infinite Chains
Returning from the chain imageasamethodological idea to its more substantive use in articulatingconceptions of reasons, we find that Wittgenstein first deploys the chain imagen ot to articulate his ownview,b ut to describe ac onception of reasons he opposes -this is the conception of reasons as forming an infinite chain:
Now there is the idea that if an order is understood and obeyed there must be areason for our obeyingi ta sw ed o; and, in fact,achain of reasons reachingb ack to infinity. ( BBB 1958:15) This picture of an infinitec hain of reasons is what underlies the intuition that every "Why?"-question could, in principle, be answered by giving ar eason. "We would liket og iver eason after reason after reason. Because we feel: so long as there is ar eason, everything is all right" (BT 2005:187) . But when one fails to live up to the demand for reasons,the same intuition engenders the impression of groundlessness and arbitrariness. In order to avoid this impression, and in the conviction that it must be possibletogiveareason, one strivestoanswer "Why?"-questions even wheret he chain of reasons has come to an end. And when one does give an answer,o nes sometimesf ails to see that what one has giveni sn ot ar eason, but ac ause: "When the chain of reasons has come to an end and still the question 'why' is asked, one is inclined to give ac ause instead of ar eason" (BBB 1958:1 5) . Such conflations of reasons with causes leave one in the grip of the expectation thattherealways has to be ajustificatory answer to "Why?"-questions. Once our inability to give reasons for our practices becomes apparent,t hese practices appear groundless and arbitrary.
If, however,weh old on to the realisation that actual chains of reasons are not infinite,t here is nothing mysterious about the idea that the enterprise of workingo ur waya long these chains by reiterating "Why?"-questions will end wheret he chain begins. "If […]y ou realize thatt he chain of actual reasons has ab eginning,you will no longer be revolted by the idea of ac ase in which there is no reason for the wayy ou obey the order" (BBB 1958:15) . "The difficult thing here is not to dig down to the ground; no, it is to recognize the ground that lies before us as the ground" (RFM 1978:3 33) . Indeed, for Wittgenstein, it is a condition on the meaningfulness of the idea of ac hain of reasons that it must come to an end somewhere. The notion of justification would lose its point if the chain of reasons werei nfinite, because the enterprise of justifyingastatement or an action could never come to rest,a nd the justification would never be complete.
The imagew hich leadsu sa stray here -the imageo ft he infinitec hain of reasons -itself has its roots in the topological metaphor of deliberative routes (BBB 1958:15) , which suggests that the possibility of giving ar eason is similar to the possibility of retracing one'sf ootsteps. Since the possibility of doing the latter nearlya lways seems intelligible, one is coaxed into thinkingt hat one should likewise indefinitelyb ea ble to give ar eason for what one says or does. But Wittgenstein rejects the idea that chains of reasons are infinitei n this way. The misleading impression to the contrary stems from the following confusion:
If […]y ou had said, "wherever youa re,y ou could have gott heref roma nother placet en yards away;a nd to that other placef romathird, tenyards further away,a nd so on ad infinitum",i fy ou had said this youw ould have stressed the infinite possibility of makinga step.T hus the idea of an infinitec hain of reasonsa rises out of ac onfusion similar to this: that al ine of ac ertain length consists of an infiniten umber of parts because it is indefinitelydivisible; i. e., because there is no end to the possibilityofdividingit. (BBB 1958: 15) Just as it does not follow from the possibility of dividing up adistance to be covered into indefinitelym anys teps thati ti sactually covered in indefinitelym any steps,i td oes not follow from thereb eing an endless variety of conceivable chains of reasons that any actual chain of reasons is infinite. The mistake, encouraged perhaps by the topological idiom of deliberative routes,i st om odel chains of reasons, which cannot be followed up indefinitely, on causal chains of events, which usually can.
Asimilar idea is invoked at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, whereW ittgenstein urgesh is interlocutor to refrain from saying: "There isn'ta ' last' explanation" (PI 2009:26) . Drawing an analogybetween achain of reasons and ar ow of houses, Wittgenstein argues that saying that "therei sn'ta'last' explanation" is like saying: "There isn'talasth ousei nt his road;o ne can always build an additional one" (PI 2009:26) . Here also, the idea is that it does not follow from the possibility of buildingindefinitelymanyhousesthat the row actually consists of indefinitelymanyhouses. There is, at anyone moment,alast house in the road, even though which housec ounts as the last one might well change over time. And the samei st rue of the "ancient city of language" (PI 2009:18) . There is, at anyone moment,something which we accept as the last explanation or justification in agiven context,eventhough we might always come to develop af urther one.
On Wittgenstein'sv iew,t hen, chains of reasons are boundt op eter out; the onlyquestion is wherethey do so, which depends on the languagegame they are givenin. He illustrates this point by comparing two languagegames: in the first, one determines the colours of objects using as ample placed "beside objectst o test whether the colours match" (PG 1974:9 6) ; in the second, one specifies the colours of objects "without as ample",b ut "in accordance with the words of a word-language" (PG 1974:9 6) , that is, using nothing but colour-words. In both variants,there comes ap oint at which the demand for reasons becomes senseless. The onlyq uestion is where thatp oint is: Suppose Ia mn ow asked "whyd oy ou choose this colourw hen givent his order; how do youj ustify the choice?" In the one case Ic an answer "because this colour is opposite the word 'red' in my chart." In the other case therei sn oanswert ot he question and the question makesn os ense. But in the first game there is no sense in this question: "why do youc all 'red' the colour in the chart oppositet he word 'red'"?Areason can onlyb e givenw ithin ag ame.The links of the chain of reasons comet oa ne nd, at the boundary of the game. (Reason and cause.) (PG 1974:96-97) While the choice of colour in the first game (playedw ith as ample) can be justified by pointing to the sample, the demand for justification in the second game (playedonlywith words) alreadyfails to make sense -thereisnoreason whywe call acertain colour "red";wemight give acausal explanation of this fact by referring to contingent facts of linguistic history or human physiology,b ut this would onlyb et on ame causes of our use of language, not to adducer easons for it.³ If one gotthe impression that the colour sample in the first game secures af orm of objectivity and prevents the chain of reasons from ending,h owever, this impression dissipates as soon as the "Why?"-question is reiterated: the sample onlyd elays the question'sl oss of meaning by one step, because as soon as we ask whyw ecall the sample "red",weagain reach the limits of the language game of colours.Our calling the sample "red" mayj ustify others tatements and actionsw ithin the game, but it cannot itself be justified within thatg ame. We widelya gree to call such as ample red, and our doing so makesi tp ossible to develop an elaborate languageg ame based on thatf act.I nt his sense, it is true that we use the word without justification. But,a sW ittgenstein reminds us in the Philosophical Investigations,t o" use aw ordw ithout aj ustification does not mean to use it wrongfully" (PI 2009:289) . The chain of reasons ends wheret he languageg ame begins.
Preciselyb ecause the chain of reasons available within the languageg ame onlyh olds in virtue of the languageg ame'sb eing played, however,i tc annot servet oj ustify the languageg ame. "The primitive languageg ame we originally learned needs no justification" (RPP 1980b: 453) , and the very idea of providing reasons for our languageg ames is misguided,because "not until there is al anguageg ame are there reasons" (RPP 1980b: 689):
 To be precise: investigating the causal history of our colourvocabularies might reveal them to be contingent in tworespects:one form of contingencyconcerns the question whether we could have used adifferent colour term; the other concerns the question whether we could have carved up the colour spaced ifferently. The first is rather trivial, while the second has givenr ise to extensive debates; see Glock .
Givinggrounds,however,justifyingthe evidence, comes to an end; -but the end is not certain "propositions" strikingusimmediatelyastrue, i. e. it is not akind of seeing on our part; it is our acting,which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC1 969: 204) Insofar as our ways of reasoning can be said to have afoundation, thatfoundation lies not in some indubitable or self-evident propositions, but in our shared communal practices.I nv irtue of their matter-of-factuals tatus, the language games embedded in our practicesa re able to playt heir foundational role as "last court of appeal" (PI 2009:2 30) when it comes to giving reasons.Weh ave no choice but to "accept the familiar languageg ame" (RPP 1980b: 453) . Al anguageg ame is "not basedo ng rounds.I ti sn ot reasonable (or unreasonable). /I ti st here -likeo ur life" (OC1 969: 559). This is an insight which runs fairly constantlyt hrough Wittgenstein'sw ritingsf rom the 1930s onwards. Alreadyi n the remarks publisheda st he Philosophical Grammar,h ec onfronts an outraged interlocutor who exclaims: "Surelyt he rules of grammar by which we act and operate are not arbitrary!" (PG 1974:1 10). Wittgenstein responds: "Very well; whyt hen does am an think in the wayh ed oes, whyd oes he go through these activities of thought?(This question of course asks for reasons,not for causes.)" (PG 1974:110) . It is in the very attempt to answer it thatt he question'sf ruitlessness emerges: "Well, reasons can be givenw ithin the calculus,a nd at the very end one is tempted to say 'it just is very probable, that thingsw ill behave in this case as they always have'-or something similar.Aturn of phrase which masks the beginning of the chain of reasons" (PG 1974:1 10 -11). Wittgenstein is adamant thata ny attempt to answer the question by giving reasons for the wayw et hink and count certain thingsa sr easons from some Archimedean pointo utsideo ur language games (or outside the calculus,a sh es till thought of it at the time)i sb ound to fail, since it must either presuppose what it wants to justify or fail to be intelligible. It must either "lead us from one such game to another" withoutmanagingtomovebeyond the rule it wantstojustify, or,w herei td oes step "outside the provinceo ft hese games" (PG 1974:1 11;B T 2005:229 -31), it will no longer be recognisable as aj ustification.
If we conflatereasons and causes, the fact that we can nearlyalwaysanswer "Why?"-questions by forming conjectures about the causal chains that led up to our actionsc an generate the expectation that we should always be able to produce reasons for them. When the expectation fails to be met,our understanding of our own actions appears defective.I f, on the other hand,wed istinguish between the "causal" and the "logical dependence" (PI 2009:220)ofanaction, between its causesa nd the reasons for it,i tb ecomes clear that "Why?"-questions demanding reasons come to an end not when they are answered, but whenthey become senseless. Demands for reasons become senseless at the point at which we reach the limits of the languagegame, apoint marked by the rules that constitute the languageg ame and enable demands for reasons to be meaningfully raised within it.S ometimes, ar eason thatf orms at erminus in one context mayb es upportable by further reasons in another context.B ut as long as one does not switch into another languageg ame in which the question of whyt he rules area st hey are can meaningfullyb er aised, the demand for reasons will gain no traction.⁴ And even when one does switch into another language game, "reasons will soon give out" (PI 2009:2 11). One will eventuallyr each a case wherei ti ss implyn ot possiblet os witch into yeta nother languageg ame: just as there is bound to be al ast house in the road at anyo ne point in time, there are bound to be reasons which cannot be givensupport by further reasons, neither in the languagegame one started out with, nor in anyother.Thisismost perspicuous in the case of "Why?"-questions demanding reasons for the norms of reasoningt hemselves: we cannot give reasons for the wayw ea re guided by reasons,since anysuch justification must presuppose what it is meant to justify if it is to be accessiblet ot he addressee.
In light of this,the right attitude to take when the chain of reasons comes to an end is to give what Robert Fogelin has called a "defactoist" (2009:2 7) response: deferring to what we,inpractice, accept as areason. An example is Wittgenstein'sc oncern with the question whether we legitimately generalise from past experience. Suggestions to the effect that we mayo nlyd os ow hen we understand the mechanisms underlying those experiences are brushed aside in the spirit of Hume with the remark thats uch an understanding would itself have to be based on past experience,which raises concerns of circularity (BT 2005:399) . Instead, Wittgenstein stressest he fact that we "simplyc all" ac ertain kind of statement about past experience ar eason for certain kinds of predictions:
Now if one asks:But how can aprevious experiencebeareasonfor assumingthat later on this or that will happen? -the answer is: What general concept of areason for such an assumption do we reallyhave? Well, this kind of astatement about the past is simplywhat we call ar eason for assumingt hat this will happen in the future. -And if youa re surprised  The expression "switchinginto another languagegame" should be taken cum grano salis. Languagegamesdonot come neatlypackaged and delineated from each other.One cannot make a list -even an open one -of all the languagegames our languageconsists of. One can describe a languageg ame that is clearlyd istinct fromo ther languageg amesb yd escribingamodel, but sincei ti so nlyamodel, it does not compete with other languageg ames. In fact,one language gamemay cross or shadow into another,forminga"complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing" (PI : ). Talk of languageg amest hus primarilys erves explanatory purposes.
that we areplayingsuch alanguage-game, then Ireferyou to the effect of apast experience (to the fact that ac hild who has been burned fears fire). (BT2 005:396) Wittgenstein'sdefactoist response is not the summoning of afurther reason, but ar eferencet oo ur communal practices. The fact that we attribute such authority to past experiencei ss omething which,onp aino fc ircularity,wec annot justify. We can ask whyw er eason as we do, but,t aken as ad emand for reasons,t he question is misguided. Wittgenstein writes: "What counts as ar eason for an assumption can be given ap riori and determines ac alculus,asystem of transitions" (PG 1974:110) . That is to say, the criteria for what counts as ar eason for what are fixed from the very beginning of the formation of acalculus and settle its mode of operation. He continues: "But if we are asked now for ar eason for the calculus itself, we see that therei sn one" (PG 1974:1 10) . Onlyi ft he "Why?"-question is taken as ad emand for causesc an we perhapsa nsweradopting an aetiological perspective on our reason-giving practices -that what,causally,makes something areason is the fact that we treat it as areason;⁵ and, still from an aetiological perspective,the fact that we treat it as areason will hardlyseem surprising in manycases. The consequences of alanguagegame may indeed explain its emergence: giveno ur needs and interests, and givent he way the world is, the child that burnt itself wasnodoubt better off if it feared fire as a result. But this does not justify the languageg ame. Thiss eems to me to be the forceo fW ittgenstein'sr emark in On Certainty: "This game proves its worth. That mayb et he cause of its being played, but it is not the ground" (OC1 969: 474). While it provides no justification, appealing to the consequences of al anguagegame does go some waytowards answering the worry that "the calculus" is "something we adopt arbitrarily" (PG 1974:110) : we adopt it no more arbitrarily "thanthe fear of fire, or the fear of aragingman comingatus" (PG 1974:110) . Just as conventional practicesingeneral are elaborationsofrudimental patterns of natural behaviour,o ur linguistic practices are rooted in primitive reactions  This suggestion was elaboratedinaWittgensteinian spirit by Jane Heal (:  -)and by Robert Brandom under the title of a "Wittgensteinian conceptionofthe normative" (Brandom : ) . According to these approaches,itisthe endorsement of certain inferential patterns in our implicitlynormative practiceswhich ultimatelydetermines the inferential relations we make explicit usingt he vocabulary of reasons, i. which, far from being "the resultofthought",are "prototypes" of away of thinking (RPP 1980a: 916) .
Ap riori Reasonsa nd Empirical Reasons
Wittgenstein'sc laim that what "counts as ar eason for an assumption can be given ap riori and determines ac alculus,asystem of transitions" (PG 1974: 110;c f. BT 2005:1 81) would seem to require qualification, however.I nm any cases, what counts as ar eason for what can indeed be given ap riori,n amely whenever the inferential relations in question are giveni nvirtue of the conceptual contents of the propositions involved. That one sees lightningn ow,f or instance, is ar eason to think that one will hear thunder soon (at least on ac onception of lightning for which it is part and parcel of the concept that it creates sound). One knows in virtue of mastering the concepts involved in this inferencet hat one is ar eason for the other.L ikewise, one can say ap riori -in virtue of having mastered the language -thatp ast experience provides reasons for certain beliefs about the future. Hence Wittgenstein'sremark in the Investigations: "How do Irecognize that this colour is red? -One answer would be: 'Ihave learnt English'" (PI 2009:381) .
In other cases, what does or does not count as ar eason cannot be given a priori. Whether something is ar eason for something else also depends on what other thingsa re true, on laws of nature and contingent facts, that is, on what claims can servea sc ollateral premises in inferences. Whether tight monetary policy is areason to think that therewill be an economic crisis not onlydepends on agreat numberofotherfactors,but is something which must be determined empirically. Finally, and cruciallyi nt his context,whether the uniformity of nature will continue to hold is also an empirical question, as is the question whether we shall continue to be able to successfullyg eneralise from past experience.
In adiscussion which prefiguresP eter Strawson'swritingso ninductive reasoning,Wittgenstein introducest he distinction between, on the one hand, the idea that the fact of our countingpast experience as areason can be given apriori and cannot be justified, and,ont he other hand, the fact that whether a particular past experience counts as ar eason depends on the context,ono ther experiences one has made,a nd on the sense one can make of ap articular experience as part of an overall picture.⁶ The latter are what we might call em- Strawson argues in his influential Introduction to Logical Theory that it is anon-contingent, a Wittgenstein on the Chaino fR easons pirical reasons,which are reasons not in virtue of theirrole in acalculus or alanguageg ame, but in virtue of their role within an overall empirical picture. Wittgenstein discusses the example of one who is asked: "Whyd oy ou believet hat this movement of your arm will be accompanied by pain?",a nd who answers: "Because sometimesi tp roducesi ta nd sometimes it doesn't" (BT2 005:3 95). Wittgenstein waveso ff: "But that isn'ta ny reason for your assumption.
[…] Yous eem to be giving the cause (the psychological cause) for your assumption, but not the reason" (BT 2005:395) . Only within acertain context does the observation form ar eason for the belief:
"Whydoyou believethat that will happen?"-"Because I've observed it several times; and evidently this is how it happens: …" (and now an extensive hypothesis is laid out). But this hypothesis,this total picture, must makes ense to you. Here the chain of reasons does not continue. -(Itw ould be morec orrect to sayt hat it comes to an end.) (BT 2005:3 96) In this passage, Wittgenstein pointst ot he fact thataparticulare xperienceo ne had in the past forms ar eason onlya sp art of an "extensive hypothesis" or a "totalp icture".O ne might,f or instance,h aveh urt one'sa rm in an accident and been diagnosed with an elbow sprain. In this context,that is, givenour understandingo fh uman anatomy, injury,b odilym ovements, pain and their relations to each other,the observation that my arm hurt in the past is indeedareason to believet hat it will do so in the future; but not,a si tw ere, absolutely,i n anyi maginable situation and in isolation from anyo ther belief. It makes sense to us as part of an overall picture.
As with languagegames, once we have accepted an observation as providing ar eason for ab elief within an overall picture, we cannot go on to provide reasons for the overall picture itself. This overall picture "must make sense" (the German original reads: "muss einleuchten"). As Wittgenstein writes, "[h]ere the chain of reasons does not continue",a nd it would be "more correct to sayt hat it comes to an end".T he "more correct" is somewhat puzzling in the English translation, as it implies that,s trictlys peaking, it is still false to sayt hat the chain of reasons comes to an end, even though Wittgenstein repeatedlyu ses priori matter that induction is rational or reasonable, while it is acontingent,factual matter that it is sometimes possible to form rational opinions concerning what specificallyhappened or will happen when the universe is such that induction will continue to be successful. The uniformity of nature is ac ontingent fact,a nd so is our ability to form rational opinions through inductive reasoning.B ut,a sS trawson emphasises, "neither this fact about the world, nor anyother,i sa condition of the necessary truth that,ifitispossible to form rational opinions of this kind, these will be inductively supported opinions" (Strawson : ).
this formulation without qualifications. But alook at the German original ("eher könnte man sagen, daß sie sich schließt")reveals the rather different idea thatthe chain closes,orcomes full circle,which might be incorrect onlyinsofar as it takes the imageo fac hain of reasons somewhat too seriously. Yett he picture of the closed chain of reasons is revealing in suggesting not ac hain which abruptly comes to an end, but as elf-contained system of beliefs which, though not tied to anything outside themselves, mutually support each other,a nd thus, as a whole,m anaget oc onvince us:
The picture and the data convinceu s, but they don'tl ead us further -towards other reasons.W es ay: "These reasonsa re convincing";a nd here it isn'tam atter of premises, from which what we were convincedo ffollows. (BT 2005:396) In the words of On Certainty,one might sayt hat it is "as ystem in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support" (OC1969: 142) thatconvinces one. Observations can convince us by enteringi nto an overall picture without that picture needing to be mediated by or derivedf rom something else. They provide non-inferentiallya cquired beliefs we treat as reasons for other beliefs without feeling the need to justify them further.The chain of reasons ends with such non-inferentiallya cquired beliefs.A nd it is preciselyt he fact that justification can come to an end in experience in this fashion which enables it to fulfil its justificatoryfunction: "Justification by experience comes to an end. If it did not,i tw ould not be justification" (PI 2009:4 85).
First-Order and Second-Order Reasons
It is helpfulatthis point to introduce adistinction between two forms of reasongiving.When ar eason is given, the demand for further reasons can take two forms. One is to demand reasons for the reason (what we might call first-order reasons); the other is to demand reasons for taking it to be ar eason (what we might call second-order reasons). Suppose we take R 1 to be areason for thinking that p is the case. There will then be, on the one hand,the first-order reason R 2 we have for thinking that R 1 is the case, and, on the other hand, the second-order reason R 1' for taking R 1 to be ar eason for thinkingt hat p is the case. The first form of the demand, which asks for ar eason R 2 for thinking that R 1 is the case, is the one Wittgenstein addresses with the remark that demands for reasons become senseless at the limit of the languageg ame, al imit markedb y the rules thatc onstitutet he languageg ame and enable demands for reasons to be raised within it.The second form, however,a sks whyw et ake R 1 to be a reason in the first place. It does not demand reasons for thinking that p,but reasons for thinking tout court. As Wittgenstein writes: "It is one thing to justify a thoughto nt he basis of other thoughts -something else to justify thinking" (BT 2005:229) .
It is against this second form of the demand, which asks for ajustification of the wayw er eason, that Wittgenstein'sd efactoist response thatt his is "simply what we call areason" (BT 2005:396) isdirected. But here our earlier distinction comes in, the one between the sense in which what counts as ar eason can be given ap riori,a nd the sense in which it can be taught by experience. In many cases, second-order reasons (reasons for taking something to be ar eason) can be given:
"Whydoyou assume that he'll be in abetter mood because Itold youthat he'sjust eaten? Is that anyk ind of reason?"-" That'sagood reason because, based on past experience, eatingi nfluencesh is mood." And that could also be put this way: "Eatingr eallyd oes makei tm orep robable that he will be in ag ood mood". ( BT 2005:398) Here, past experience provides as econd-order reason (R 1' )t ot hink that one's having eaten is ar eason (R 1 )t ob elievet hat one will be in ab etter mood (p). But if one asks whyp ast experience should be regarded as ar eason in this respect,t he chain of reasons ends once more:
But if one wanted to ask: "And is everythingy ou put forth about past experience ag ood reasontoassume that this time toothis is the wayitwill be?" then Ican'tsay: "Yes, because that makes the occurrence of the assumption probable." In what Isaid earlier Ijustified my reasonu singastandardf or ag ood reason; but now Ic an'tj ustify the standard. (BT 2005: 398) While experience can in principle give us both first-a nd second-order reasons, Wittgenstein'sr eflections aim to show thatt he fact that we take experiencea s as tandard for what counts as ar eason for what cannot itself be justified by experience: "Here there can be no further talk of justification" (BT 2005:398) . This is an insight Wittgenstein considers worth reiterating in On Certainty:
But isn'ti te xperiencet hat teaches us to judge like this, that is to say, that it is correct to judge likethis?But how does experience teach us,then?W emay derive it fromexperience, but experiencedoes not direct us to derive anythingfromexperience. If it is the ground of our judginglikethis, and not just the cause, still we do not have aground for seeingthis in turn as ag round. (OC1 969: 130) Justifying our thinking and judging in this sense would requiremore than giving a cause of our thinkinga nd judging as we do. Thed emand for such aj ustifica-tion is thus revealed to be the self-contradictory demandf or ar eason "outside the game of reasoning" (AWL 1979:4 ) .
In one regard, the moralisthe same as in the caseofdemands for first-order reasons for reasons:ifthe giving of reasons is to perform anyfunction, there has to be apoint at which our reason for believing theretobearationalising relation between ar eason and what it is ar eason does not derive from experience,f or otherwise aregressthreatens, and with it the pointlessness of engaginginjustifications in the first place:
If the relationship of ar eason to what it is ar eason for weret aught by experience, one would have to ask the next question: "And what is your justification for takingt hat as a reasonfor this belief?" And it would go on in this way; and belief would never be justified. (BT 2005:399) One needs some standard of measurement in order to measure the weight of any considerations on the balance of reasons.F ailing such as tandard,the question whether something can weigh in as ar eason cannot be meaningfullyraised: "If these aren'tr easons,w hat are? […] 'Not reasons'-as opposed to what?" (BT 2005:397) . This passageadumbratesStrawson'spoint that it is anon-contingent, ap riori matter that induction is rational or reasonable (1952: 262) .The fact that experience provides as tandard for justification cannot,i nt he same sense of "justification",b ei ndependentlyj ustified, but is ac onstitutive norm of the game of reasoningasweplayit-the "defining equation simplyhas no solution. We haven'te stablished anym ethod for its solution" (BT 2005:399) .Thus, while chains of causes can usually be prolongedbyhypothesising further causes (BBB 1958:88) , chains of reasons come to an end in the "defining equations" thatconstitute the reasoning calculus and enable reason-giving to geto ff the ground in the first place.
Explanation and Justification
The pursuit of chains of reasons and causest ot heir ends is of course an old theme,e pitomised in the Kantian "quest for the unconditioned" (1929:A307/ B 364).⁷ Exploiting this fact,wecan throw Wittgenstein'sconstrual of the dichotomy into relief by holding it up against contrasting construals proposed by Kant  According to Kant,the "principle peculiar to reason […] i ni ts logical employment is: to find for the conditioned knowledgeobtained through the understanding the unconditionedwhereby its unity is broughtt oc ompletion" (:A/B ).
commentators. One such is A. C. Ewing,w ho drawsas trict parallel between chains of reasons and chains of causes:
If the cause is viewed as explainingorgivingthe reason of the effect,then this suggests that theremust be somethingwhich is its own cause, otherwise causation givesnoultimateexplanation or reason at all, just as it would be futile to give achain of the reasonsfor accepting aproposition if none of them could,any morethan the original proposition, be seen to be true in their own right. ( Ewing1 938: 218) ForEwing,itisacondition on successful causal explanation that the cause given can be traced to "something which is its own cause",acausa sui. Likewise, chains of reasons must lead to self-evident propositions if they are to provide support for the justificandum. On this view,r easons and causes are on ap arthey systematicallyl ead on to otherr easons and causes, respectively,a nd both fulfil their purpose onlyi nsofara st he chains thus followed up come to an end in some unconditioned condition. This conception would seem to differ from Wittgenstein'si ni ts denial thatt here is an asymmetry between chains of reasons and chains of causes.
By contrast, another Kant commentator,Jonathan Bennett,agrees with Wittgenstein that there is an asymmetry,but conceivesofitin preciselythe opposite way. Accordingt oBennett, it is not chains of causes that always lead on to further causes, but chains of reasons that lead on to further reasons until some secure basis is reached:
It is true that my deriving Q from P givesy ou no reason to believe Q unless youa lready believe P,b ut it is not analogouslyt rue that my showingy ou how e 1 led to e 2 givesy ou no explanation of e 2 unless youc an explain the occurrence of e 1 .Ajustification needs a justified basis,b ut an explanationd oes not need an explained basis. ( Bennett 1974:185) On Bennett'saccount,areason R 1 to believeinaproposition p provides support onlytothe extent thatthere is areason R 2 to believethat R 1 is the case, and the support provided by R 2 is in turn conditional on thereb eing af urther reason R 3 to believeR 2 ,etc., until one reaches aproposition which one alreadyaccepts,the "justified basis" of justification. Explanations by appeal to causes are different insofar as determiningthe cause e 1 of an event e 2 is by itself sufficient to explain e 2 ,n om atter whether e 1 is in turn explained or not.
We seem to have here threecompeting construals of the dichotomybetween chains of reasons and chains of causes: either they both lead on to some unconditioned condition, or onlychains of reasons do, or onlychains of causesdo. Can Ewing'sa nd Bennett'sa ccounts be reconciled with the Wittgensteinian model? By wayo fc onclusion, Is hall brieflys et out how and to what extent they can be brought together,a nd in the process, we shall answer our last question: how does the distinction between chains of reasons and chains of causes relatetothe distinction between explanation and justification?
Ewing,i nhisc laimt hat chains of reasons and causes alike must end in some unconditioned condition, fails to distinguish between causation and causal explanation: e 1 causes e 2 ,but it is the fact that e 1 happened which causallyexplains the fact that e 2 happened (cf. Strawson 1992: 112 -13). Further,toc itet he fact that e 1 causes e 2 and the fact that e 1 happened is to give reasons to believe that e 2 happened, and therefore to place them in the chain of reasons.E wing's claim that chains of causesmustlead to a causa sui must therefore be disentangled from the claim that causal explanations must come to an end if they are to be explanations at all. The first claim is one which Wittgenstein neither contradicts nor affirms, since he never asserts thatchains of causesa re literallyi nfinite, but onlyt hat it is usually "easy enough" (BBB 1958:8 8) to hypothesise further causes. Ewing'ss econd claim, meanwhile, is in line with Wittgenstein's insistencet hat chains of reasons come to an end, since the reasons in question mayb ee ither explanatory reasons (answering the question "Whyd id X happen?")o rr easons to believet hat X happened. In this sense, chains of reasons are chains of causal explanation, and Wittgenstein concurs with Ewing in the opening paragraph of the Investigations when he writes: "Explanations come to an end somewhere" (PI 2009:1) .
Where Bennett'saccount is concerned, which at first appears to be the exact mirror imageo fW ittgenstein's, as imilarlyc onciliatory readingc an be offered. Bennettclaims, first,thatone'sderiving q from p givesone no reason to believe that q is the case unless one alreadybelieves that p is the case; second, he claims that one'sshowing how e 1 causallyled to e 2 explains e 2 independentlyofwhether one can explain the occurrence of e 1 .Wittgenstein could assent to bothpropositions. Bennett'sf irst claim points at the regress of justification, the fact,a sh e puts it,t hat every justification needs a "justified basis".B ennett'sp oint is not, however,t he sceptical one encapsulated in Agrippa'sT rilemma, the claim that attempts at justification must either lead to an infinite regress, circularity or arbitrarydogmatism. It is merelythat in order for p to justify q,itisnot enough to show that q can be derivedfrom p -p must itself be known to be the case if it is to servea sabasisf or the justification of q. Yett he principle that for one proposition to justify another,the former must be more certain than the latter,i so ne which Wittgenstein recognises straight at the outset of On Certainty:
When one says that such and such ap roposition can'tb ep roved, of course that does not mean that it can'tbederivedfromother propositions;any proposition can be derivedfrom other ones.B ut they mayb en om orec ertain than it is itself. (OC1 969: 1) Wittgenstein can thereforeaccept thatevery justification needs ajustified basis, because what Bennettbringsout is not an asymmetry between chains of reasons and chains of causes, but an asymmetry between justification and explanation.
The fact that the distinction between chains of reasons and chains of causes does not line up with the distinction between justification and explanation becomes particularlyperspicuous when we consider the matter in terms of the contrast between intensionality and extensionality:r eason relations,a nd therefore chains of reasons, differ from causal relations,and therefore from chains of causes, in thatt hey are intensional: "…is ar eason for…" is ar elation thath olds not between singular terms or events,but "between facts or truths" (Strawson 1992: 109) . Causal relations,meanwhile are extensional: "…is acause of…" is arelation that holds between particulare vents. By contrast,e xplanation and justification are both intensional. It mayb et hat ac ertain event e 1 caused ac ertain event e 2 , but it is the fact that e 1 occurred which explains the fact that e 2 occurred, and it is the fact that p is the case which justifies the belief that q is the case. Now,Bennett'sp oint is that justification requires ajustified basis, while explanationdoes not requireanexplained basis. But this is something which Wittgenstein is in no waycommitted to denying,and it does not affect his claim that chains of reasons come to an end. Quite the contrary, since explanation alsorequires a justified basis: e 1 mayexplain e 2 independentlyofwhether e 1 is itself explained, but it does not explain e 2 independentlyo fw hether one is justified in believing, first,t hat e 1 causes e 2 ,a nd second,t hat e 1 occurred. Therefore, it is as crucial to explanations as it is to justifications thatc hains of reasons come to an end and thereby provide the required support for the claim thatacts as explanans.
Where Bennett and Wittgenstein mayw ell part ways is over the question of what counts as a "justified basis".B oth Bennetta nd Wittgenstein agree that one'sd eriving q from p giveso ne no reason to believet hat q is the case unless one alreadyb elieves that p is the case. But,a sw es aw with regard to the claim that experience justifies something'sbeing areason without itself being justified in its justificatorystatus,Wittgenstein is committed to denying that the justificans p must always be justified over and beyond its being believed: "At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief thatisnot founded" (OC1969: 253). Certain beliefs are more certain thana ny others and can servea sajustificatory basis for other beliefs, but not because they are indubitable or self-evident,a nd without being justified in turn by even more certain beliefs. "It is not single axioms that strike [one] as obvious",but "asystem in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support" (OC1 969: 142):
The child learns to believeahost of things.I.e.itlearns to act according to these beliefs.Bit by bit theref orms as ystem of what is believed, and in that system some thingss tand unshakeablyf ast and some arem oreo rl ess liable to shift.What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsicallyobvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it. (OC1 969: 144) We come to master linguistic and reasoningp ractices through demonstration, imitation,a nd repetition in training situations that are themselvesr ooted in our natural capacities and primitive reactions.I ti ss uch training situations which provide the "justified basis" or "bedrock" (OC1 969: 498), the justifier which, because it is inaccessiblet oq uestions of justification, is able to playa foundational role as the highestc ourt of appeal in questions of justification. "Sure evidence is what we accept as sure, it is evidence that we go by in acting surely, acting withoutany doubt" (OC1969: 196). Insofara sjustifications have a foundation, they have afoundationinour practices, and it is in virtue of the role certain beliefs playinour languagegames that they possess their air of indubitability,h eld in place by the communal practices they are part of -just as the "foundation-walls are carried by the whole house" (OC1 969: 248).
When viewed through the lens of the concept of reasons,Wittgenstein'swritingsc an thus be seen to offer us ar ich and nuanced conception of reason and rationality.R easons, whether ap riori or empirical, first-order or second-order, link up immediatelyt of orm finite chains of reasons anchored in and held in place by our reason-giving practices.The resulting conception of reason and rationality could be said to be both liberatinga nd limiting.I ti sl iberating in the sense that in bringingo ut the complexities and particularities of reason-giving practices,Wittgenstein dissuades us from modelling chains of reasons on chains of causes; the must of rational necessity is altogether different from the must of causal necessity,and realising this allows us to view the fact that chains of reasons come to an end not as limitation on reason, but as an enablingconditionit is preciselyb ecause of their finitude that chains of reasons can guide,j ustify and explain our thoughts and deeds. Yetthis conception of reasons is alsolimiting,i nt he sense that it firmlyc hains reason to the particularw aysw eh aveo f going on, to the shared complex of activities, purposes and language-use in which there is minimal agreement on what counts as areason for what.Reasoning-practices constrain what one can discover that one has reason to do, and reasoning-practices maydiffer from one form of life to the next.Both these aspects might be summed up by saying that though we mayb ee verywherei nc hains, these chains are not everywheret he same.
